At this end some relief could be secured by C.D. having his own staff of cyphers; abroad I fear the F.O. may say their existing staff already has as much as it can do.

10 MAR 1941

FROM C.D. CD/XX/870

910

NEW YORK

3.3.41.

1605

4.3.41.

0700 G.S.T.

FOLLOWING FOR S.O.2. FROM U.

A. PLEASE LOCATE WILLIAM C. AIREY REPEAT AIREY, FORMERLY OF SCHWAB AND SMELLING NOW IN ROYAL AIR FORCE.

B. HE IS KNOWN TO MR.DAS AND HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.

C. I EXPECT TO NEED HIM URGENTLY.

D. PLEASE MAKE PRELIMINARY ENQUIRIES.

E. IF THERE IS DANGER OF HIS BECOMING NOT AVAILABLE PLEASE ENGAGE OR RESERVE HIM.

F. IF POSSIBLE I SHOULD PREFER NOT TO ENGAGE HIM DEFINITELY UNTIL I RETURN.

C.D.	ADB	
	L	
	WAD	
	Etw PA	
U		

At this end some relief could be secured by C.D. having his own staff of cypherers; abroad I fear the F.O. may say their existing staff already has as much as it can do.

10 MAR 1941

From C.D. CD/XX/879

To Mr. JEBB 9th March 1941.

2 papers.

S.O.2 Communications through C.

1. You are - to my great content - going to take up the question with the Foreign Office in the near future as to whether some at any rate of our more urgent telegrams can be handled by the Foreign Office.

2. This is of course only a very small portion of the problem which S.O.2 is now contending with in respect of its communications generally, with especial reference to the arbitary supervision which C. exercises over such communications.

3. I want to be absolutely fair and dispassionate in reviewing this question and one must always remember that the inception of these communications through C. took place when D. Branch, as it was then entitled, was a small subsidiary branch of the main organisation, viz. C.

4. In these circumstances, and having regard to the conditions which quickly grew up under my predecessor, it was a wholesome and necessary check on his activities.

5. The organisation S.O.2, as it now stands, has of course grown out of all recognition as compared with the D. Section in August 1940 when I took it over, and the volume of telegrams (and incidentally their importance) has probably trebled, if not quadrupled.

6. Whilst there is no direct evidence - human nature being what it is - there is no shadow of doubt in my mind that C. telegrams take complete preference over S.O.2, notwithstanding whether the latter are marked Z, ZZ, ZZZ. At the present time it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that our telegraphic communications through C. have broken down almost completely and the average length of time it takes a telegram to reach us from the Balkans or the Middle East is about four days; if marked ZZZ we may hope to get it in twenty four hours or perhaps forty eight.

7. The main reason for this is the inadequacy of the staff of cypherers and decypherers at 54 Broadway - and in view of the many and repeated warnings which you yourself have heard me give to C. in regard to the certain increase in the volume of our telegraphic traffic, there is no doubt in my mind that they stand convicted of not having made sufficient preparation to meet eventualities.

8. There is however a great deal more to this question than the delay in telegraphic communications.

9. By means of S.O.2 telegraphic traffic coming through 54 Broadway, a type of inquisitive censorship over the whole of our actions has been set up by the C. organisation and it is not an infrequent occurrence to have our outward telegrams held up while they are discussed departmentally in C., and alternatively to have the inward delivery delayed pending similar discussion.

10. In regard to W/T sets - a so vitally important part of S.O.2 equipment now that country after country is being over-run by Germany - a dictatorial supervision is exercised by C., who take up the attitude:-

a) that we must only obtain W/T sets through them;

b) that we can only send these W/T sets to our men in the field through the C. men in that part of the world;

c) that these sets are not to be put into use without the permission of C;

d) that no other W/T sets are to be used, whatever the circumstances may be, in any part of the world, whether between overseas and England or between Stations overseas without express permission of C.

11. There are almost daily occurrences which cause recrimination and dispute between the two organisations based on all the above facts - but the underlying threat throughout all such discussions - whether amicable or otherwise - is that our communications have to go through C. and that if we do not behave ourselves they will withhold them.

12. It is of course emphasising the obvious to say that they would not succeed in any endeavour to withhold communications - nevertheless the C.S.S. himself has on more than one occasion reiterated to me that he considers himself entitled to decline to send any telegram from S.O.2 through his communications with which he does not agree.

13. My own view is that the time has come to take this whole matter up with Sir Alec Cadogan -

a) firstly, to ascertain what volume of our communications the Foreign Office could probably handle;

b) to endeavour to get a re-statement of the position of arbitary supervision which C. claim they are at present entitled to exercise over S.O.2 communications.

14. I look upon C. as the "Common Carrier", so to speak, appointed by Government to carry S.O.2 communications and I deny absolutely that they have any power to exercise the arbitary discipline to which we now have to submit if we want to get our telegrams sent or received at all.

15. It is only right that you should at this juncture refresh your memory by re-reading the Charter (to which I was a party of course) agreed between C. and D., as it then was, early last September.

16. The C.S.S. was too clever for us (prompted thereto no doubt by), for neither you nor I were sufficiently acquainted with S.O.2 matters at that juncture to realise what we were doing when we gave him the powers which he has in that Charter.

17. I feel very strongly that we should get that Charter re-charted and that we should endeavour to persuade the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform the S.I.S. that it is the wish of H.M.G. that they should handle such part of S.O.2 telegraphic communications as may be desired by the latter - and which the circumstances of C. will permit - and that they should act in this matter precisely on the same basis as the Post Office acts for Government Departments and the general public. In regard to all other matters, such as W/T sets etc., S.O.2 should have a completely free hand and not be subjected to the arbitary supervision which is so irksome to us at present; the reasons for such supervision given to us by Gambier-Parry are, I am assured by Squadron-Leader Pyle our own expert, largely staged for the benefit of the uninitiated, and except on broad general lines are neither true nor operative.

18. I suggest as the first step that perhaps you could take me with you to talk to Alec Cadogan on this matter in a personal and private sense so that we may give him the atmosphere - for looking ahead I can foresee only growing trouble in this subjection of our own people to Gambier-Parry (noted for his inaccurary and non-adherence to the truth), who is the real trouble as Head of the C. Technical Section; presumably our traffic will increase and our general needs grow wider and wider and before very long, if present conditions continue, we shall find ourselves in an almost inextricable dilemma.

C. D.

THIS IS A COPY ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

5th April 1941

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
RETAINED IN DEPARMENT
UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF
THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

COS (41) 142nd meeting

21 April 1941

9th April 1941

S.O.E COMMUNICATIONS.

IMMEDIATE
MOST SECRET

21st April, 1941.

You will remember that you asked us to be in a position to give, at the meeting this afternoon, a short statement of the achievements of S.O.2 since the inception of that organisation.

See in box file - Progress Reports

We thought it would be useful to put this statement in writing and I therefore enclose five copies of the document which we have prepared. Do you think it would be possible to get copies circulated urgently to the Vice-Chiefs before the meeting? We shall of course be in a position to elaborate orally where necessary.

(Sgd) PHILIP BROAD

Colonel L.C.Hollis, R.M.,
Offices of the War Cabinet.

6th April 1941

S.O.2 COMMUNICATIONS.

20 APR 1941

W/-

C/D to see.
M 19/4.

OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET
AND OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE,
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
S.W.1.

SECRET.

CW 22/4

19th April, 1941.

Dear Broad.

In confirmation of our telephone conversation of this morning, I hope you and whoever you wish to bring with you may be able to attend the meeting with the Vice Chiefs of Staff on Monday, 21st April, to discuss the points raised in Jebb's letter to Ismay No. W.1951 of the 12th April.

The Vice Chiefs of Staff have been informed of the gist of Jebb's letter and they have suggested that, to enable them to form a judgment on the questions raised in paragraph 10, it would be very helpful if they could be given a brief statement of the achievements of S.O.2. This will place them in a better position to decide on priorities.

The meeting will be at 5.30 p.m. at Great George Street, Conference Room 'B'.

No answer required this

Yours sincerely

L. Ismay

P. Broad, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

5th April 1941

S.O.2 COMMUNICATIONS.

SECRET
S/2018

18th April, 1941.

Many thanks for your letter of the 15th April about communications. As soon as I got it I told Joe Hollis on the telephone that we would certainly welcome a meeting of the Vice Chiefs-of-Staff and, from our point of view, the sooner it was held the better.

I myself am going on about a week's leave tonight, but no doubt it would be possible to have it some time next week when Nelson would be available.

(Sgd) [illegible]

Major-General Sir H.L.Ismay, K.C.B., D.S.O.,
Offices of the War Cabinet.

6th April 1941

S.O.2 COMMUNICATIONS.

18 APR 1941 W/-

Not yet seen by Sir Bernard.

16 APR 1941
W/-

From C.D. CD/XX/118

To C.E.O. 16th April 1941

Communications.

1. Herewith is a copy of a memorandum I have received from C.II

2. I think our reply should be that we are already a good way on with all our arrangements for founding our Coding Section, and that in any case alternative means are always desirable to have in these uncertain days.

3. We might perhaps discuss the exact terms of my reply tomorrow morning.

C. D.

I told C/D this morning that C.E.O. agreed with nature of reply proposed.

[illegible]

8th April 1941

S.O.2 COMMUNICATIONS.

16 APR 1941 W/.

COPY C/6240

LONDON. 15th April 1941.

C/D.

This is to let you know that my Code Section is now right up to date and it occurs to me that you may, therefore, judge it advisable on security grounds, to go slow with the creation of your own Code Section.

C.

5th April 1941

S.O.E. [illegible]

16 APR 1941

This with more further warning not I suppose the suggested meeting must be agreed to.

10/iv

UP

12th April 1941

S.O.E. [illegible]

Most secret.

1/1941.

12th April, 1941.

I hate to worry you at the present time but I think you ought to know that we are approaching a crisis in our development.

2. You will have seen from our plans and projects statement the various things that we want to do in Western Europe during the next three months. In addition to these various projects we shall want to drop as many "organisers" as possible in the occupied areas in order to foment disaffection and generally start the rot. There is no reason for me to tell you how important the function of such "organisers" is likely to be. On their activities may well depend the development of a situation which we shall ultimately put to our advantage from the military point of view.

3. At present we have, in various stages of training, something between 300 and 400 agents, and these will no doubt be increased as time goes on.

4. The short point is that few of our organisers are likely to do any good unless they are equipped with a /[illegible] and carefully trained in transmission and reception: this, of course, we can do, though we are encountering difficulties even here. But however many people we may drop, so equipped and so trained, will avail us nothing unless there is an organisation at this end which can take their communications in.

5. As you know, our wireless communications as a whole are at present carried by the S.I.S. over their

system/-

Major-General Sir H.L. Ismay, K.C.B., D.S.O.
Offices of the War Cabinet.

could at the moment handle their traffic with fewer operators. Is it not, therefore, for consideration whether they should not be ordered by the Cabinet to hand over a certain number of operators and technicians to us at once.

10. It boils down to this :

(a) Do the Chiefs of Staff attach real importance to the proposed activities of S.O.E. in Western Europe ?

(b) If so, are they prepared to give S.O.E. a certain - very limited - preference over the other Service departments ?

system; and we are now told by [illegible] that he is not in a position to [illegible] in [illegible] than a very few organisers when we may be able to drop abroad [illegible]

6. It is not, it appears, a question of lack of material, provided that the equipment for a new station, ordered by [illegible] in America [illegible] arrives safely, and is not sunk [illegible] by [illegible] is supply in regard to operators and technicians. If, in fact [illegible] is given 16 technicians and [illegible] operators in addition to his present staff he will be able to carry the increased traffic which [illegible] comfortable. Otherwise, he will not.

7. I know that Lord [illegible] is [illegible] his [illegible] and to secure enough technicians and operators for the towers and that there is a little [illegible] additional [illegible] I think to the fact that he not [illegible] years the needs of the service departments first [illegible] the S.O.E. second.

8. What, therefore, I would like you to do is to ask the [illegible] to give a ruling that the effect that the provision of at least [illegible] technicians and 40 operators to [illegible] for [illegible] purposes, is a matter of overriding importance and must be given absolute priority over everything else. I do not think that, in making this request, we are really closing our mouths very wide, seeing that unless we get at least this number of operators, we shall not be able to function in Western Europe at all whereas the other services, though they might go slightly short as a result, would certainly not be quite entirely out of action, as we should be. Furthermore the total number that we should require is a drop in the ocean compared to the total amount required for the other services.

9. Finally, I should like to say that we have heard from other sources that certain public communication companies such as, for instance, Cables and Wireless,

could --

5th April 1941

[illegible]

MOST SECRET

12 APR 1941
w/-

C/6221.

[illegible]

11th April, 1941.

[illegible]

[illegible]

12th April 1941.

Many thanks for your letter of the 11th April (C/6221), about communications.

I have duly embodied the minor amendment in the draft letter to Jamy, which you propose, and am now sending the letter off.

"C"

"C" — I think it [illegible] has no comments, [illegible] cannot get [illegible] on the phone. And [illegible]

R. M. S. Jam, [illegible]

[illegible] April 1941

[illegible]

MOST SECRET

12 APR 1941
w/-

C/[illegible].

[illegible].

11th April, [illegible].

My dear Glanwyn,

With your letter [illegible] of the [illegible] inst., you sent me a draft of a letter to Italy.

I am in agreement with the contents, except that I would like the word "[illegible]" in paragraph [illegible], on the first line of the second page, changed to "[illegible]", [illegible] I [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

Regarding paragraph [illegible] of your draft, I am informed that [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

11th April 1941

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]
S/1954

9th April, 1941.

I send you herewith copy of a letter which I propose to write to Tommy about our communications. It should really have been typed out as a draft so do not hesitate to make any amendments that may occur to you. If, on the other hand, you think it is all right so much the better.

(Sd) G A [illegible]

C.

5th April 1941

S.O.E. [illegible]

Most Secret

[illegible]

9th April, 1941.

I hate to worry you at the present time but I think you [illegible] to know that we are approaching a crisis in our development.

2. You will have seen from our plans and projects attached the various things that we want to do in [illegible] during the next three months. [illegible] to those various projects we shall want [illegible] in order to [illegible] connection and generally [illegible]. There is no reason [illegible] to tell you how important the function of such organisers [illegible] to be. [illegible] activities may well [illegible] and the development of [illegible] situation which we shall [illegible] to our advantage from the military point of view.

3. At present we have, in various stages of training, [illegible] between [illegible] and 200 agents, and these will no doubt be increased as time goes on.

4. The short point is that [illegible] of our organisers are likely to do a good [illegible] unless they are equipped with [illegible] and really trained in transmission [illegible] reception; this, of course, we can do, though we are [illegible] difficulties even here. But however [illegible] we may drop, so equipped and so trained [illegible] will be working unless there is some organisation at this end which can take their communications in.

5. As you know, our wireless communications as a whole are at present carried by the [illegible] over their systems/-

Major-General Sir [illegible] Ismay, K.C.B., D.S.O.
Office of the War Cabinet.

system; and we are now told by C that he is not in a position to [illegible] more than ever [illegible] organisers [illegible] be able to drop abroad.

6. It is not, it appears, a question of lack of material, provided that the [illegible] station ordered by [illegible] in [illegible] arrives safely, and is not [illegible] in regard to operators and technicians [illegible], in fact C is given 16 technicians and [illegible] operators in addition to his present staff he will be able to carry the increased traffic which [illegible] contemplates, otherwise, he will not.

7. I know that Lord Trenchard is at his wits' end to secure enough technicians and operators for the Forces and that there is little, if any, hope of obtaining additional men through him. [illegible] I think in the last [illegible] he not naturally puts the needs of the Service departments first and those of the S.O.E. second.

8. What therefore, I would like you to do is to see the Chiefs of Staff to give a ruling to the effect that the provision of 1 least 16 technicians and 40 operators to C for a [illegible] purpose, is a matter of overriding important and must be given absolute priority over everything else. [illegible] to do this, in [illegible] this request, we are really [illegible] our mouths very wide, seeing that unless we get at least this number of operators, we shall not be able to function in [illegible] at all, whereas the other services, though they about go slightly short as a result, would certainly not be [illegible] completely out of action, as we should be. Furthermore the total number that we would require is a drop in the ocean compared to the total amount required for the other services.

9. Finally, I should like to say that we have heard from [illegible] sources that certain public [illegible] companies such as, for instance, Cables [illegible] Ireland [illegible].

could

could at the same time handle their traffic with fewer operators. It would, therefore, appear some question whether they should not be asked by the Chiefs to hand over a certain number of operators and technicians to us at once.

It boils down to this:

(a) Do the Chiefs of Staff attach real importance to the proposed activities of S.O.E. in Western Europe?

(b) If so, are they prepared to give S.O.E. a certain - very limited - preference over the other Services departments?

5th April 1941

S.O.S. Committee.

It is of course within the knowledge of the Chiefs

From C.D. CD/XX/42

5 APR 1941

I have suggested a few minor amendments, writing them in pencil

5th April 1941

S.O.E. Co[illegible] [illegible].

1 It is of course within the knowledge of the Chiefs

From C.D. CD/XX/42

To C.A.O. 5th April 1941

Communications.

1. I attach herewith a memorandum to C. for your approval and, needless to say, for such additions and/or alterations as you may care to make.

2. My idea is that this memorandum should form the basis of our Paper to the Chiefs of Staff.

C. D.

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necessary arrangements [illegible] copying; we are in process of [illegible] and copying people t is end and of course t[illegible] will be submitted to you in the course.

It is unhappily the case these days that arrangements never go according to plan and whilst we are [illegible] that

5th April 1941

S.O.E Communications.

It is of course within the knowledge of the Chiefs

SECRET

CD/XX/333 5th April 1941

Dear C.,

Communications.

Referring to our talk of yesterday, I am attaching herewith a memorandum which - subject of course to your approval - may I think perhaps form the basis of a Joint Paper to the Chiefs of Staff.

Needless to say Gladwyn and I will be very pleased to discuss this with you again before we take the next step.

I may say that in my talk with Ambler-Harry yesterday we reached what one might call an internal agreement, under which I understood from him that, subject always to your approval, S.O.E people overseas should be allowed to equip their secret agents with W/T and to endeavour to arrange that such agents should communicate with wherever S.O.E. headquarters may be in the particular country concerned (or in the case of the Balkans probably some contiguous country), provided always that we advise your people (if any) in the transmission centre and in the reception centre of the times and wavelengths etc. which we are proposing to use.

The wider question of contact in London with our agents in France, Holland, Belgium etc., I have endeavoured to deal with in the attached memorandum.

Finally, in regard to what one might call routine day to day communications, we are proceeding as quickly as possible along the lines in respect of which we have agreed viz., we have already received from the War Office the requisite number of code books and we have hopes, barring accidents, that we may get these out to their respective destinations without undue delay: our people in the Balkans and Near East tell us that they can make the necessary arrangements their end in regard to coding and cipering: we are in process of arranging coding and ciphering people this end and of course their names will be submitted to you in due course.

It is unhappily the case these days that arrangements never go according to plan and whilst we are hopeful that

we may get this arranged without undue delay, we must I think anticipate the usual maddening delays.

Yours sincerely,

[illegible]th April 1941

S.O.2 C[illegible] [illegible].

1. It is of course within the knowledge of the Chiefs of Staff that S.O.2 have a number of plans and projects, a weekly report on which is submitted to General Ismay.

2. S.O.2 have at present in various stages of training somewhere between 300 and 400 agents, who will be required to carry out such plans as may be finally approved by the Chiefs of Staff.

3. In practically all cases there is a vital necessity for one or more members of any crew selected to undertake a plan to be equipped with W/T apparatus and to be trained in transmission and reception of such.

4. Our Communications as a whole are carried by S.I.S. over their system and the position has now been reached where it is not possible for the number of agents which we may quite reasonably wish to employ in the near future to be adequately trained and equipped and the necessary arrangements made by S.I.S. for the [illegible] of their messages as and when they arrive in the countries where it is proposed that they should operate.

5. The primary difficulty responsible for this state of affairs is lack of man power - in other words Technicians and Operators are required to a number of [illegible]

6. We therefore suggest to the Chiefs of Staff that the matter has now reached a stage where we must ask them to direct the relevant Governmental Authority to [illegible] Public Communication Companies, such as for instance Cables and Wireless, and to acquire from them and [illegible]

any other source which may be available such personnel as will enable the Communication difficulty as above outlined to be overcome. We may perhaps add that the Hankey Commission has had this difficulty submitted to them, but is unable to assist having regard to their prior instructions to repair a large shortage in W/T personnel which is at present being experienced by all three fighting services.

7. We are not anticipating any difficulty in regard to equipment necessary for the reception of such communications - provided always that the equipment for their new station, which is at present en route somewhere on the Atlantic, arrives safely into port.

S/L 4

---

24 April 1941.

Dear, I refer you to your letter of the 21st [illegible] and at the telegram from [illegible] to Marvis which you kindly got the Foreign Office to send for us.

The reply is contained in new form telegram No. 271 of the 18th March, which has unfortunately only just reached us, as the Foreign Office could it officially to the [illegible]. This telegram starts by saying that the Allied Corporation have no [illegible] of the prior referred to in the out telegram. Identifying details are requested.

The second part of the telegram refers to an order with a rotor different specification. I learn, however, that there is [illegible] misunderstanding, and this is very probably the order in which we were interested. No further action is, therefore, required, unless you consider it necessary to send a further telegram to New York to explain this.

Many thanks for your help.

(Sd.) [illegible]

W.L. Cornell-Harness Esq.,
Offices of the War Cabinet,
Great George Street,
S.W. 1.

SECRET

With the compliments
of the
Under Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs

30 MAR 1941

136/71/Z P Broad Esq

Z

W3343/55/49

Copy also to:-
Mr Brand (CO)

INDEXED

Ref. to letter of Mar 27
No W3343/55/49

30MAR1941

[illegible] .D.

[illegible]

[illegible] March, 1941.

Secret

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Mr Brand

Ministry of Economic Warfare

This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.

With the compliments of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] .D.

[illegible]

[illegible] March, 1941.

[illegible] any thanks for your letter of the [illegible] March ([illegible]), about the question of our [illegible] [illegible] discussed when we lined with [illegible] on the [illegible] [illegible].

This will, therefore, confirm that you raise no objections to S.O.2 sending their official communications by [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] public channels, [illegible] James's Street.

I note that you will let us know later on if and when you feel it would be a good idea for S.O.2 communications to go through your channels [illegible].

In the meantime S.O.2 will immediately set about endeavouring to [illegible] their own [illegible] [illegible] in which they are [illegible] interested.

S.O.2 will send you copies of all [illegible] to your organisation in any cases in which [illegible] other channel.

It is not expected that S.O.2 will meet with any delay in [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] are [illegible] of the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] the [illegible] other end may (in the present state of communications) take some time.

[illegible] regard to the problem of secret [illegible] communication with Spain - I note that it is to have a [illegible] with [illegible] a view to [illegible] if [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible], as in the [illegible], independent of your [illegible].

[illegible], [illegible], but there is a [illegible] are [illegible] under the [illegible] that any attempt [illegible] their [illegible] are strictly subject to [illegible]'s permission, and [illegible] was invariably [illegible] on the ground of [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] have had their [illegible].

[illegible]

Draft.

Dear C.,

Thank you for your L/C [illegible] of [illegible], which [illegible] quite admirably the points several [illegible] we discussed with [illegible] on the [illegible].

This will [illegible] you to know that you may [illegible] S. [illegible] in their official communications by means of the [illegible] cipher and that such [illegible] will be sent by [illegible] channels, i.e. [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] permitting the [illegible] S.O.E. traffic [illegible] - [illegible] that you will advise us to revert to the [illegible] system.

In the meantime S. [illegible] will [illegible] later, not about [illegible] to form their own Communications [illegible] and in those Countries Overseas in which they [illegible] interested.

S. [illegible] will [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] will [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

It [illegible] that S. [illegible] will [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] problem of Secret [illegible] communication with A[illegible] - I note [illegible] a view to [illegible] two-way traffic can be set up [illegible] a[illegible] way in [illegible] areas independent of your main line.

[illegible] ly [illegible] people [illegible] and [illegible] ly [illegible] that any attempt at such [illegible] communication between S.O.2. and their A[illegible] was strictly - [illegible] to [illegible]'s permission, and that such was invariably withheld [illegible] of "security".

[illegible]

---

22 MAR 1941

Central Office for North American Supplies,

21 MAR 1941

I have signed
[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Draft.

22 MAR 1941

Central Office for North American Supplies,

OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET
GREAT GEORGE STREET, S.W.1

SECRET.

21st March, 1941.

Mr. Sweet-Escott

I enclose a minute by Pyle about communications.

I am not at all clear whether I am expected to take any action on it, or if not, who is. Surely if it is expected that I am to act, the minute ought to have been addressed to me instead of to Byers, who I confess I do not even know? Could you be so very kind as to make enquiries into this?

(Sgd) [illegible]

21st March 1941.

P. Broad, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

D. o. I.

22 MAR 1941

Central Office for North American Supplies,

OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET
GREAT GEORGE STREET, S.W.1

SECRET.

21st March, 1941.

My dear Broad,

Just a line to let you know that we have asked Ashton at the Foreign Office to send off the telegram from Brand to Purvis on the lines of the draft enclosed in your letter of the 20th and to send a copy direct to you.

Yours ever,

W. Granville Ramsay

P. Broad, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

21 MAR 1941

W/

MOST SECRET

*8 E 4/7



[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]

21 MAR 1941

W/

[illegible] 3.6. [illegible] July 1940

[illegible] 3.1.6. [illegible] 1941

[illegible]

C. D.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible] writing the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

4. I need [illegible] to the [illegible] of all telegrams [illegible] received by [illegible] sent to you for your information and further [illegible] that any [illegible] deciphering clerks which we may be fortunate enough to train will of course be [illegible] the [illegible] in the ordinary sense and thus the individuals concerned can be vetted by you.

5. In so far as what I may call the other aspect of our [illegible] the other night, vide secret dispatch - this may take some little time before we will be completely [illegible] with your organisation with your experts - but I think you see some of the difficulties which [illegible] to bring this matter up for the [illegible] I [illegible] it is [illegible], merely that our immediate plans in this very complex involve the placing of experts who, if they [illegible], will have secret communications with us.

6. Whether it will prove possible for [illegible] to be in many [illegible] operate with wireless sets and to arrange for the transmission and reception of secret communications [illegible] to be seen; but on the assumption that this or very [illegible] the principle involved is to [illegible] of and consent to our endeavours to [illegible] communications.

7. I know you will be, if any doubt [illegible] but things move so quickly [illegible] that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the whole of our future plans are dependent upon increased wireless communication between our agents and our headquarters [illegible] It is such that we feel unable to proceed with any certainty in the matter of our plans until we can see wider facilities for [illegible] development.

authority to have a considerable station of our own and [illegible]

C.D. /1438

[illegible] paper of the 1[illegible] on communications [illegible] to the conclusion that E has not read the paper to which [illegible] strong exception. [illegible] in the document which, incidentally, was not, so far as I know, in the quarter but [illegible] dated 15th September, 1940 between "C" and [illegible] then "D", as to their respective functions reads as follows :-

"c) Communications:

C will continue to afford to D such facilities for the use of D.I.S. ciphers and communications as the requirements and security of D.I.S. demand, but these communications will remain under the control of C. [illegible], for any reason a telegram submitted by D. for transmission by C be rejected by the latter, CD will of course be informed in such case and will endeavour to make other arrangements."

It seems to me quite clear from this that [illegible] wishes to put the facilities of his communications department at [illegible] which are included both ordinary telegrams to our representatives and select communications sent directly to agents) at our disposal subject only to "C"'s own requirements being met and to "C"'s security not being imperilled. There is not [illegible] in the [illegible] requirements [illegible] our own communications and indeed, the last phrase suggests that he is willing to do so. [illegible] only reason [illegible] beginning organise our own communications [illegible] because C was quite able, at the time, to cope with our traffic and that we did not [illegible] prospect of any agents working in eastern Europe for ever. Moreover, I always had the impression - perhaps the wrong impression - that our proposed organise system of [illegible] communication with agents on our own would be, in practice, restricted by our reception facilities, unless we could get

authority/-

authority to have a considerable station of our own, and this, should have to begin, might well present difficulties.

Anyhow, I believe [illegible] now agreed [illegible] to our having our own cipherers [illegible] our representatives [illegible] trying out in the [illegible] whereby we [illegible] our own sets and our own operators [illegible] in touch with dissident elements in over-run countries.

It is true that, according to the strict letter of the agreement, [illegible] concurrence in this is not necessary but I am sure that it is highly desirable seeing that, like so [illegible], we are still in [illegible] to get considerable [illegible] in our [illegible] that [illegible] lieutenant-colonel [illegible], is not only able but willing to put several more.

I would be glad to have your comments and those of [illegible] on the new situation which has arisen [illegible] my interpretation of the so-called 'charter', as set out above.

[illegible]

20th March, 1941.

[illegible] To [illegible] [illegible] March 1941.

From [illegible]

[illegible] W/1037

[illegible]

20th March, 1941.

SECRET

You will remember that you were good enough to help me some time ago in connection with an order for valves placed in the United States. I wonder whether you could possibly do the same again? If so, I should be most grateful.

The point is that we have ordered an experimental valve from the Radio Corporation of America. The order was in the name of the Signals Development Branch. Could you possibly get your people to telegraph to New York with a view to expedition the delivery of this valve in the same way as was done in the previous cases? As the cancel will probably be quite small I take it that there will be no difficulty about getting it out either on the clipper or on a bomber.

Would you suggest a telegram somewhat on the lines of the attached draft?

(Sgd, [illegible])

W.L.Correll-Barnes, Esq.,
War Cabinet Offices,
Great George Street,
S.W.1.

NEW. No. Cab. 1 th March 1941.

From E.

March, 1

Telegram

To: NEW YORK.

Signals Development Branch have ordered, from Pacific Corporation of America, an experimental five watt transmitting triode valve made to their own specification It is understood that this valve is ready for delivery. Please arrange for despatch by plane in the same way as was done in the case of articles referred to in my telegram No.

[illegible] C.D. [illegible] 1941.

[illegible]

[illegible]

From C.L. [illegible]

[illegible] Mr. [illegible] 17th Mar 1941

PA/EL/925

19.3.41.

TO: MR. BROAD

FROM: P.A.

Could you please have the following telegram sent to Washington:-

"R.C.A. have an experimental five watt transmitting triode valve race to our specification ready for delivery. Please collect and forward by quickest method."

This valve is required in connection with our Micro-Wave wireless tests.

P.A.

[illegible] To C.D. 17th March 1941.

From [illegible]

From C.D. C/X/211

To Mr. J[illegible] 17th March 1941

1. I attach a memorandum compiled by our wireless expert in line with the position of "secret wireless" requirements in C.O.S. and bearing on our difficulties with C. as they now appear to stand.

2. It does not get us much further, but may perhaps clarify our views preparatory to [illegible] when [illegible] the C.O.S. are to fire with [illegible] thereafter discuss, on the basis of a "fire side chat", the whole of this theory location.

3. I have invited Leverett to make a fourth, for his influence with the C.O.S. is very [illegible].

C. D.

[illegible] C.P. [illegible] 1st [illegible] 1941.

From E.

1. An agreement exists, commonly called "The Charter", by the terms of which S.O.E. agrees to be completely dependent upon "X" organisation for communications. This agreement must have been made without realisation of its implications. Security reasons do not permit our respective agents to meet in the field. The only way we can get communication over, therefore, is by putting our own agent into territory with radio equipment provided by "X" and by depending on the capacity and willingness of the XW organisation at this end for receiving facilities.

2. To do our part properly we must employ a number of agents in this manner in many occupied countries. We are informed that the number must be limited (a) by the capacity of the receiving scheme; (b) by the fact that to increase the number to any extent will constitute a menace to security and (c) that we must not expect to have sufficient allotted to us for the purpose of being able to report "having destroyed a bridge or a train". In order to obtain a satisfactory set up, a working schedule we have to submit our proposals to XW and they decide whether, in their opinion, the personnel involved in any attempt to be accomodated.

3. [illegible]

(a) If this is so now, at the commencement of our association, the limit of agents in France will soon be reached. [illegible] to be kept up [illegible] or.

b) [illegible] security of illicit wireless transmissions [illegible] security. It [illegible] security in time, in frequency, or in position. If it can be all three so much the better. [illegible] all three [illegible]. I [illegible] security problems. I [illegible] They vary their frequency according to a predetermined plan. It would be inconvenient to vary time [illegible] of other schedules [illegible] to vary position [illegible] located [illegible] in [illegible] interface. [illegible] would [illegible] more [illegible]. [illegible] conditions [illegible] to [illegible] stations [illegible]. I [illegible] the [illegible] security [illegible] become a fetish. I opposed wireless silence in the [illegible]. I have [illegible] experience in Direction Finding work [illegible] "[illegible]" type of interception listening. [illegible] Direction Finding is [illegible] easier. In practice alternate communication is [illegible]. [illegible] number of [illegible] to interception [illegible] reduction of [illegible] interception [illegible] complete [illegible] successful. [illegible] illicit transmitting [illegible] <u>[illegible]</u> interception, [illegible] [illegible] completely legitimate communication [illegible] with the [illegible] [illegible] that [illegible] [illegible] intelligent [illegible].

c) It appears that perspective is some extent here. [illegible] in the service of operational effort, [illegible] control it.

4. In the [illegible] we are faced with [illegible] for transit to [illegible] the delivery of [illegible] our men until [illegible] left. [illegible] that it was also [illegible] that these [illegible] political [illegible] in the military [illegible] dress [illegible] will therefore be [illegible] correct [illegible] or [illegible] it [illegible].

5. [illegible] political [illegible] vacuum that [illegible] rather has [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

From C.I. CI/[illegible]

[illegible] 1[illegible] March 1941

From C.D.

To AD/A CI/41/207

12th March 1941.

"Whispers".

1. I attach copy of a letter from C. together with my reply.

2. I [illegible] a word with Brooks about this story and it was his [illegible] that this is a [illegible] at [illegible] turns [illegible] [illegible] on [illegible] to [illegible] in [illegible] it is not your intention to [illegible] this story.

3. The subject is [illegible] and [illegible] declare [illegible] "[illegible]" [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] or control [illegible] connection [illegible].

4. At this [illegible] I spoke to you on the telephone, [illegible] to [illegible] with a [illegible] or [illegible] that they will endeavour to [illegible] their own [illegible] with the Foreign Office in regard to the [illegible] of these rumours through Foreign Office channels.

5. I feel that we should take up the attitude that we after all have [illegible] to do with the "[illegible]" except the [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] and transmitted, [illegible] we do not really come into this discussion, which to my [illegible] between Naval and C.

C. D.

W/

10 MAR 1941

From C.D. CD/XX/883

10th March 1941

CD/WL/265 12th March 1941

Dear C.,

"Whispers".

Thank you for your letter C/5976 of 11th March.

In confirmation of our telephonic conversation this afternoon - I am sending a copy of your letter to Charles Hambro with a request that he shall bring it up before the Joint Meeting of S.O.1, S.O.2 and others, which is held every Saturday morning to discuss the above subject.

I know that you appreciate that S.O.2 do not really come into this at all until the "whispers" have reached their destination, from which they are disseminated by means of our organisations in the various places concerned; in other words we do not manufacture the "whispers" and hitherto they have been transmitted over S.I.S. lines, so that strictly speaking this seems to be a matter really between S.O.1 and S.I.S.

I hope I need hardly say that any action I can take to co-operate with you in this or any other matter will most certainly be taken.

Yours ever,

W/

10 MAR 1941

From C.D. CD/XX/883

10th March 1941

COPY

C/5978.

MOST SECRET

LONDON,

11th March, 1941.

My dear C/D.,

I am writing to confirm that part of our conversation of Friday which dealt with the transmission of rumours by means of S.I.S. communications.

As I explained to you, our staff at Budapest has had to be decreased; Istanbul, in addition to its own work, is acting as the receiving station for the Balkan countries, whilst the staff at Athens are overworked and likely to become more so. This makes it absolutely imperative that we should reduce W/T communications to the minimum level compatible with efficiency, and for that reason I would ask that only such whispers as are both brief and of urgent importance should be sent to us for transmission through S.I.S. lines.

I feel confident that you will co-operate with us in this respect, and that rumours not fulfilling the above requirements will be sent through other channels.

Yours ever,

C.

10 MAR 1941

From C.D. CD/XX/883

To Mr. JEBB 10th March 1941

S.O.2 Communications through C.

1. In continuation of my CD/XX/879 of 9th March, I enclose two "exhibits" which should be used and read in conjunction with the Memorandum above referred to.

2. The first is a copy of a telegram sent by C. to their representative in Cairo, from which you will see that five wireless sets, so urgently and vitally needed by our men in Belgrade and Athens, are still not to be released without authority from XW, which is Gambier-Parry.

3. In other words we are only allowed to equip these agents of ours, who, without wishing to use exaggerated language, are gambling with death every hour of the day, unless we have the permission of Colonel Garbier-Parry, safely ensconced in a Home County, whose decision may be based upon the caprice of the moment.

4. I further enclose a telegram from Vickers, dated New York 3rd March - and as you will see received at 54 Broadway on 4th March and delivered to us to-day 11th March.

5. I am very much afraid that we must make this a frontal attack, for it is absolutely impossible to continue the work of S.O.2 if we are subjected to this complete breakdown in communications - to say nothing of the other disabilities to which we are subjected and as to which I have written you fully in my previous memorandum.

C. D.

At this end some relief could be secured by CD. having his own staff of

10 MAR 1941

MID EAST. 7.3.41.

Z Z Z

CXG. 529.

Following from XW.

Our CXG.473 of 23.2.41.

A. Immediately W/T sets for S.O.2. arrive despatch two to and three to Retain remainder at your station.

B. None, repeat none, of these sets are to be released to S.O.2. representatives without authority from XW. They are to be held by our representatives.

C. Our CXG.149 of 30.12.40. refers to four of these sets. Two others should arrive or have arrived in addition.

D. You may consult with S.O.2. representative as to best means of transport to

E. Telegraph how many of these sets have arrived.

Origin VIII.

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